Introduction
Two Groups of Philosophers
It is possible to divide philosophers into two groups:
- First, those that think there was an original unity, now lost, that we should strive to restore. This is, of course, the biggest group, from Plato through Christianity to Heidegger.
- The second, much smaller group, the minority report, believes not unity, but difference; or struggle is original. Famously, this is Heraclitus: “war [or struggle] is the father of everything.”1 Nietzsche is another, and we can include postmodern philosophers like Derrida and Deleuze in this one too. And, perhaps, surprisingly given his reputation as a ’totalitarian system thinker’: Hegel.
Jena 1806

In October 1806, while Hegel is finishing his manuscript for the Phenomenology of Spirit in his home town of Jena, Napoleon’s army is entering the city. Hegel has to get his manuscript to his publisher in another city and fears it may not survive the upheaval. He decides to bring it to his publisher himself. On route, he crosses paths with that army’s leader, emperor Napoleon himself. As Hegel later wrote in a letter:
“I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it.”2
The world-soul concentrated on a mere individual body on horseback: two opposites come together. The movement of world (European) history is incarnated in an individual man at a single point in time.
The French Revolution and the Terror
Napoleon’s empire is the result of the French Revolution. With regard to the French Revolution, there we can establish two main positions:
- The liberal position: The French Revolution itself was a good thing—bringing freedom from the authority of the king and church—but the following Terror was not, and could have been avoided.
- The conservative position: The Revolution and the Terror belong together; therefore, both are bad. If change were needed, it should have been gradual—evolution, not revolution.
Now Hegel says both are right and both are wrong. Indeed, the French Revolution was a good thing; it was necessary to force a break. And indeed, the Terror was necessary, because it was already included in the Revolution. You couldn’t have had the Revolution without the Terror, unfortunately.
Why Hegel? Hegel’s Method of Dialectics
His philosophy takes—as we shall see—its momentum from the French Revolution, and it can be seen as a response to it and its philosophical background: the Enlightenment.
Even his method, called dialectics, resembles the Revolution’s logic. Rather than reasoning from axioms and deducing further insights, rather than taking sides in debates, instead he distinguishes a contradiction, and when the opposites of the contradiction clash, there is a shift. This shift is not a harmonious unity or synthesis, but a move to a new plane with its own contradictions. The two poles of a contradiction are in a relation of negativity, also called alienation. This sounds abstract, but I hope to show this in his dialectics of the French Revolution.
First, we have to go back in time a bit, to the preceding philosophical background: modernity and Enlightenment
1. Modernity (science, Descartes): Consciousness3
Modernity starts with the Scientific Revolution: instead of relying on authority and deducing from axioms, nature is approached with mathematics, and results are induced from experiments.
Insight: Truth
This revolution is described philosophically by Descartes. He breaks with the Aristotelian rational order, and unity of world and human reason.
Descartes introduced the idea of a human consciousness that is sure of its own existence. The material reality is outside of this consciousness, and is thus its object of study. Human consciousness is the subject of reality, and reality is its object. Consciousness and reality become opposites. Hegel calls this approach insight. It strives to establish the truth of the material reality.
Faith or Belief: Certainty
The scientific revolution also changes the way God is viewed. He is no longer than the pure intellect at the top of the rational order of the universe, of which He is thus still a part. Descartes instead recasts God as the pure consciousness that transcends both human consciousness and reality. Descartes tries to hold the two opposites linked, by thinking God as the one who ensures the reality which human consciousness is conscious of, is indeed real, and not imaginary. Hegel calls this recast God as a transcendent pure consciousness faith (Glaube). The human consciousness derives its certainty from this pure consciousness.
2. Enlightenment: Insight versus Faith4
Now for Hegel, the Enlightenment starts when insight turns against faith. Insight becomes opposed to faith.
Insight (Truth)
A big part of the Enlightenment effort is to collect all knowledge. Empiricists collect data about the world around them. Diderot worked on an Encyclopedia. At the same time it tries to weed out superstitions, prejudice and falsehoods. The Enlightenment tries to find against superstitions, prejudice and falsehoods, and it argues against the authority of the clergy. It targets the ignorance of the masses, the deceit of the priesthood, and its despotism. So, the insight is in Hegel’s sense, negative: it is against a lot of things. It turns this negativity against faith.
Faith (Certainty)
This negativity of insight is contagious and affects the understanding of faith, as it gets emptied out. This can be seen in the two popular views of faith for Enlightenment thinkers.
- First, deism, which means God is stripped of all superstitions, which is everything, and only remains as a transcendent being, without any properties. God is a mere empty ‘Supreme Being’. (Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau)
- Second, is more radical: atheism, which abolishes this rather empty being altogether, since only the material reality is real, no God-thing can be found in it. God is just imaginary, a fiction. (Diderot, Baron d’Holbach)
Insight versus Faith
Insight struggles against faith. In this process, insight reduces itself to materialism, and faith is reduced to deism (or atheism). Both forget the human consciousness they both originally came from and depend on. And their object has become empty. Just like the deity of deism is an empty supreme being, the matter of materialism does not concern concrete, experienced things, but a theory of colors, a theory of stones. Matter is theoretical, an abstract representation (Vorstellung).
Since both are a kind of consciousness, this consciousness is torn and alienated. In a way, for Hegel, while consciousness thinks it is fighting something alien outside of it, in fact it is struggling with itself. It is turning – unknowingly – its negativity against itself. Therefore Hegel says ‘Enlightenment isn’t very enlightened about itself’.5
Usefulness: Utility
As a consequence, the only remaining measurement of things is usefulness, utility: utilitarianism (Bentham). Only material things are real, but also abstract, empty, they can be used for something else. Humans can use things and each other, nothing stands on its own, nothing is a substance. People are striving for their own individual goals, like growing wheat, or baking and selling bread. In this way, ironically, each one is contributing to the general usefulness for society. There is an Adam Smith-like ‘invisible hand’ at work. Like Mandeville’s fable of the bees: the bees are each doing their own individual thing, benefitting the general beehive.
And even religion can be used as something useful. The emptiness of the ‘Supreme Being’ is a symbol of utility: everything and everyone can be used for something else by someone else: nothing stands on its own, everything is empty in a way.
3. French Revolution and Terror: Absolute Freedom6
French Revolution: from Utility to General Will
The French Revolution is the step from utility to, what Hegel calls, absolute freedom. The new Assembly identifies itself with the general will of the people, based on the idea of la volonté générale as developed by Rousseau. Which means there is no difference any more between the individual will and the general will, as there was with the strive for individual utility. The Assembly purports to run the beehive. This will bring absolute freedom.
The general will has all the power, without any counter-power. All estates have been dissolved. Its goal is the general goal, its law is the general law. There is no difference between individual and general consciousness, which means the strive of individual utility has lost its meaning.
Fury of Disappearance
Since there is no difference between the individual and general consciousness, the general will can’t do anything singular. It can only make laws, and proclaim declarations and constitutions. This absolute freedom of the general will doesn’t have any object other than itself. No individual act or work can qualify as being general works. The general will therefore cannot produce any positive work.
It can only do negative things, a wave of changes, of destruction. There is a fury of disappearance, like the ever changing constitutions and declarations. Abolishing the king. Abolishing the rights and powers of the Catholic church, de-Christianise the state. Instead, a new religion of Reason (1793), then of the Supreme Being (1794). Abolish the existing calendar, in favour of a new one. A new declaration of rights (1789), then another (1793).
Factions: from Guilty to Suspicious
Since the Assembly is supposed to represent the general will, anyone who doesn’t agree is the opposite of it. That means the Assembly splinters into factions (Girondins, Maraisards and Montagnards who split again into Robespierrists, Hébertists, Dantonistes), where only the victorious faction represents – ironically – the general will. However, being a faction supposedly representing the general will, is a crime. It makes them guilty. The guilt applies to all factions, and there is no apparent evidence of being guilty. Therefore it is enough to be a suspect rather than guilty (Law of the Suspects, 1793). And since the suspects are suspected of breaking the general will, they should be persecuted.
Terror: Death by Guillotine
All changes don’t fulfil the general will: it doesn’t have any content. It can only negate: it is only this negativity that keeps it going. It is enough to be suspicious to fall prey to the negativity. The general will turns to negate the individual citizens that are suspected of threatening the general freedom. Its only act is death. Its instrument is the guillotine. Even the deaths of the executed by the guillotine have no positive meaning. It ‘means nothing more than slicing a cabbage or a sip of water.’7
Conclusion: Negativity
Absolute freedom, which was supposed to be something positive for everybody, has become purely negative, self-destructive. It has become the opposite of what it thought it was. Absolute freedom’s only substance is pure negativity. And yet, it is rooted in the self consciousness of Descartes.
So this is a moment of discovery. Self consciousness is revealed to have negativity, not outside itself, but part of itself. The terror of death is the perception of its own negative essence. And shocked by fear of meaningless death, the people fall back to their individual minds, which however has been ‘refreshed and rejuvenated’. Self-consciousness has learnt its lesson: its own negative force, its alienation. This alienation is only ‘negative’, but also something ‘positive’: it is the driving force of history and Hegel’s method of dialectics. It refreshes and rejuvenates. This self-insight not only shows Hegel’s method of dialectics, of ’tarrying with the negative’,8 and at the same, a shift to a ‘new realm’, where new contradictions await. But that is for another time.
Château de la Bijoire, July 2026
- Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστί (DK 22 B 53). ↩︎
- “den Kaiser – diese Weltseele – sah ich durch die Stadt zum Rekognoszieren hinausreiten; es ist in der Tat eine wunderbare Empfindung, ein solches Individuum zu sehen, das hier auf einen Punkt konzentriert, auf einem Pferde sitzend, über die Welt übergreift und sie beherrscht”, Hegel, letter of 13 October 1806 to F. I. Niethammer, no. 74 (p. 119) in Briefe von und an Hegel ed. Hoffmeister, vol. 1 (1970), cited after H. Schnädelbach in Wolfgang Welsch, Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht, Wilhelm Fink Verlag (2003), p. 223; trans. Pinkard (2000:228). From: Wikipedia:Geist. ↩︎
- Cf. PhG VI.B.I, PhS §487-537. ↩︎
- Cf. PhG VI.B.II, PhS §538-581. ↩︎
- “Die Aufklärung selbst aber (…) ist ebensowenig über sich selbst aufgeklärt.” PhG VI.B.II a p. 418, PhS §565 ↩︎
- Cf. PhG VI.B.III, PhS §582-595. ↩︎
- “der kälteste, platteste Tod, ohne mehr Bedeutung als das Durchbauen eines Kohlhaupts oder ein Schluck Wassers”, PhG VI.B.III p.436, PhS §590. The sip of water is possibly a hint at the drowning of counter-revolutionaries in Nantes (see Comay 2011). ↩︎
- “indem er dem Negativen ins Angesicht schaut, bei ihm verweilt.” (PhG Vorrede p. 36, PhS §32) ↩︎
Bibliography
- G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1986 [PhG]
- G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: OUP, 1977 [PhS]
- R. Comay, Mourning Sickness. Hegel and the French Revolution, Stanford: SUP, 2011
- H. F. Fulda, D. Henrich, Materialien zu Hegels ›Phänomenologie des Geistes‹, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973
- O. Pöggeler, Hegel, München: Alber, 1977
- L. Siep, Der Weg der Phänomenologie des Geistes. Ein einführender Kommentar zu Hegels »Differenzschrift« und »Phänomenologie des Geistes«, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2000